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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
·of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES J. MILLIGAN, 
Plat"vrdiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
CAPITOL FURNITURE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, GLADYS PETER-
SON, 1\fARY E. SHULSEN and JAMES 
H. SPRUNT, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8777 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT 
The parties will be designated as 1n plaintiff's 
brief. vVhere the word defendants is used it means the 
individual defendants who are defending this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As plaintiff has failed to set forth any of the facts 
surrounding his fall, we deem it necessary to do so. 
The testimony is uncontradicted that the plaintiff 
fell on a sidewalk in front of defendants' building located 
on West Second South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
that the sidewalk was 20.9 feet wide extending from the 
defendants' building to the curb line on Second South 
Street (Ex. D-15). 
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2 
The weather reports covering the months of January 
and February, 1956, Exhibit D-16 and Exhibit D-17 dis-
close thai there was no snow from January 27th until 
February 7th; that the average temperature was below 
freezing and the maximum temperature was below freez-
ing from January 31st through February 7th. 
Plaintiff is employed by the Railroad (R. 32) and 
on numerous occasions prior to his fall had stopped at 
the Salt Lake Restaurant for a bite to eat prior to going 
to work. He testified that he left his home about 4 :00 
o'clock P.M. on the day of the accident with his friend 
and neighbor, Lewis Johnston (R 33). J\1r. Johnston 
drove plaintiff to the Salt Lake Restaurant, which is 
located about 539-563 West Second South, the entrance 
of which is .approximately 27 feet from the place where 
plaintiff fell (R 33). 
Located in front of defendants' building was a 
sidewalk elevator properly covered by two steel doors, 
said doors covering an area of approximately 4-6 feet 
square. Attached to the building directly west of the 
steel doors was .a drain spout, which carried water from 
the roof of the building down into a hole in the sidewalk 
and ultimately out into the street (Ex. D-14). 
There is conflict in the testiJ.nony as to the condition 
of the sidewalk extending from the cafe east up to and 
past the Beer Barrel, which was some distance east of 
where plaintiff fell .and as to what plaintiff did prior to 
the time he fell. 
Plaintiff testified in his deposition taken in October, 
1956 that when he arrived at the restaurant there was 
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a little snow on the sidewalk in front of the restaurant. 
He had a cup of coffee and had started east for the 
railroad station when he fell. His friend was not going 
to take him to the station (R. 88). 
On direct examination he testified he had a sand-
wich and coffee and in .about 15-20 minutes left the cafe 
and started east. There was snow and ice on the sidewalk, 
but it was pretty clear in front of the restaurant. In 
response to a leading question he testified that the side-
walk in front of the restaurant was clear (R. 33-35). 
He further testified that there was ice near the big 
steel doors and he started to walk around where it 
looked good and clean. He was of the impression that 
ice and a skiff of snow extended over the entire sidewalk 
(R. 35-36). 
On cross-examination he testified that he was 
familiar with the premises where he fell as he went there 
nearly every week (R. 82). At the restaurant he ordered 
some sausage and coffee and while the sausage was 
being cooked he went 'Out to look for a Mr. Hardman 
(R. 82). He definitely stated that his friend was not 
going to drive him to the station (R. 83). Further in 
his cross-examination he testified that he went to look 
for Mr. Hardman. He went west to Shulsen's Restaurant, 
returned and had a cup of coffee .and that there was 
snow and ice over the whole sidewalk. 
Mr. Johnston, plaintiff's witness, definitely stated 
that he was going to take plaintiff to the train. In 
describing the activities of the plaintiff he stated that 
he .and plaintiff had stopped at the restaurant, ordered 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
food and that plaintiff immediately left and within a few 
minutes thereafter he was advised that plaintiff had 
fallen (R. 99). In describing the condition of the sidewalk 
east of Yvhere plaintiff fell he testified it was clear, 
except for a strip about five tJo eight feet in width 
which extended across the sidewalk (R. 105). 
Alex Geros, who had operated the cafe for years 
and knew the plaintiff, testified that the entire sidewalk 
was clear, except for about three to six feet around the 
drain pipe (R. 117) and that plaintiff told him just 
before he fell that he was going to the Beer Barrel 
when he left the cafe (R. 118). 
POINT TO BE RELIED UPON 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN ENTERING A VER-
DICT IN FAVOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN ENTERING A VER-
DICT IN FAVOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiff's Points 1, 2, 3 and -1 will be discussed 
under defendants' one P1oint. 
The third point argued by plaintiff is that plaintiff 
w.as not contributorily negligent as a matter of law. This 
question is not involved in this case. The jury by its 
answer to Interrogatory No. 5, which was: 
.. INTERROGATORY NO. 5. Was plaintiff 
negligent in walking across the ice where he fell. 
"'ANSWER. Yes." 
~- tha 
;.j;ci! t 
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found that as a matter of fact plaintiff was negligent 
and this finding by the jury is supported by the evidence. 
The plaintiff under the s.ame point discusses the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's answer 
to Interrogatory No. 5, claiming the same to be insuffi-
cient. The conflict in the plaintiff's own testimony and 
the facts supporting the inference that plaintiff was in 
a hurry, together with testimony that he was familiar 
with the condition ·Of the sidewalk; that the sidewalk 
was 20.9 feet in width and only a small portion of the 
same was covered with ice are sufficient to support the 
jury's finding that plaintiff did not exercise due care 
and caution and was negligent in walking across the 
ice where he fell. 
In plaintiff's second point he contends that if the 
answers to the special verdict questions are inconsistent 
a new trial should have been granted, and in connection 
with this argument, quotes the last sentence of Rule 49 
(b). Rule 49 (b) does not involve the question of special 
verdict and interrogatories, but involves the question of 
general verdict accompanied by answer to interrog.atories. 
In this case there was no general verdict rendered. The 
Court submitted the cause under subdivision (a) Rule 
49, which deals with special verdicts and interrogatories. 
This procedure is upheld and supported by the case of 
Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah 2d 68, 262 P. 2d 270, wherein 
the Court st.ated: 
"There is no question but that it is within 
the descretion of the trial court to follow such 
procedure if he so desires. According to the an-
swers given, the jury found the defendant guilty 
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of negligence, but also found the plaintiff was 
~ontributorily negligent, upon the basis of which 
the trial court entered a judgment for the defend-
ants." 
The dissertation by Moore and other expounders of 
the jury system, in our opinion, have no place in this 
case, for regardless of ·our respective views in connection 
therewith, under our present system we are governed 
and controlled by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
in this case as indicated by Rule 49. This brings us to 
the final question, was the Court justified in entering 
.a judgment in favor of the defendants"' ..rn view of the 
_, 
answer to Interrogatory N·o. 6, which was: 
"INTERROGATORY NO.6. Was such negli-
gence a proximate cause of plaintiff's f.all ~ 
"ANSWER. No.",? 
The view stated in the case of Anderson t:. Bransford, 
39 Utah 256, 116 P. 1023, we believe, is correct: 
"It is true that the question of proximate 
cause is ordinarily one of fact for the jury. This 
is so because of different conclus~ons generally 
.arising on a conflict of the evidence, or because 
of different deductions or inferences arising from 
undisputed facts, in respect of the question of 
whether the injury was the natural and probable 
consequence of the proved negligence or wrongful 
act, and ought to have been foreseen in the light 
of the attending circun1stances. 'Yhere, however, 
there is no such conflict, and where but one de-
duction or inference under the eYidence is per-
missible, then the question of proxin1ate cause is 
one of law."' 
futbi 
.i:rrf\1"3E 
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In this case there is no question but that plaintiff's 
injury was caused by slipping on the ice on the sidewalk. 
The jury has found that plaintiff was negligent in 
crossing the ice. With these two undisputed facts, how 
could anyone arrive at a conclusion that plaintiff's negli-
gence in crossing the ice did not contribute to his fall. 
There is no evidence which shows any other intervening 
c.ause. The ice upon the sidewalk and plaintiff's negligence 
in crossing the same caused the fall and the injury. An 
adult person who is negligent in crossing ice must reason-
ably anticipate that some injury might result. This is 
the only deduction or inference which is permissible, 
therefore it is a question of law as to the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's fall. 
As stated in the case of Smith V. Shevltn v. Hixon 
Co. 157 F. 2d 51 (9th Cir.) the Court held that: 
" 'In order to constitute a particular act the 
proximate cause of the injury.' Maimi Quarry Co. 
v. Seaborg Package Co., 103 Ore. 362-371, 204 P. 
492-495. It is sufficient if the wrongdoer would 
have reasonably anticipated that some injury 
might result~.¢ 
Can we say that one negligently crossing a slippery 
place may not reasonably anticipate that s1ome injury 
might result{ 
In the case of Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Howard 
(Ark.) 161 S.W. 2d 759, the Court stated: 
"Had she stopped, before reaching the main 
line track, she could have heard the train and had 
she looked, after easing by the obstruction, she 
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eould have seen it. It was there, making a loud 
noise, whether the whistle was blown or the bell 
rung, and signals cease to be a factor where the 
train is plainly discoverable by other means. Thus 
her own negligence was the proximate cause of her 
injury, if any, which is doubtful." 
See also Pacific R. R. Co. v. Dawson, (Ark.) 168 SW 
2d 1105. 
In the case of Black v. City of Berea, (Ohio) 32 NE 
1, 132 A.L.R. 1391, where plaintiff a passenger in an 
automobile permitted her arm to extend outside of the 
automobile and strike a rural mailbox located on the 
side of a public road, the Court held: 
"She was familiar with the road and the loca-
tion of the mailboxes, including the one here in 
question. It was broad daylight, and the evidence 
shows that the mailbox was in plain sight. Under 
such circumstances, a person of ordinary prudence 
would not have had any part of her arm out the 
window of an automobile. As a matter of law, 
plaintiff was guilty of negligence which was the 
proximate cause of her injury, and it was the 
duty of the court to sustain defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict." 
The Court in the case of Tr old v. Ogden CHy, 123 
Utah 270, 258 P. 2d 453 in quoting from Dean P:r;osser 
stated: 
"Dean Prosser points up the principle as it 
applies to the instant case when he asserts that 
an objective standard 1nust maintain, and that 'the 
plaintiff cannot be heard to say that he did not 
cmnprehend a risk which must have been obvious 
to him.' Further that 'as in the case of negligence 
_._. 
:.- .. :-.:: 
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there are certain risks which anyone of adult age 
must be taken to appreciate; the danger of slip-
ping on ice, or falling through ungarded openings,' 
etc. He goes on to say that 'In the usual case, 
his knowledge and appreciation of the danger will 
be a question for the jury; but where it is clear 
that any person of normal intelligence in his posi-
tion must have understood the danger, the issue 
must be decided by the court.' " 
In the case of Houston E. & W. T.R. Co. v. Lynch, 
208 S.W. 714, plaintiff was assisting his wife and married 
daughter in getting on the train. The train started before 
he could get off. 
"It is manifest (from all the evidence in the 
case), or at least it is sufficient to warrant a 
finding, that appellee was not caused to fall from 
the train because of a sudden jirk or lurch, but 
that he fell while in the attempt of alighting from 
said train to the ground. But on rehearing, the 
judgment was reversed. On this occasion the court 
said: 'We have concluded that if the plaintiff, 
Lynch, was guilty of negligence, which was left 
as a question of fact to be determined by the 
jury, then it follows as a matter of law that such 
negligence p~oximately contributed to the injury. 
It is the contention of appellee, however, that 
this requested instruction takes from the jury both 
the issue of negligence on the part of the plaintiff 
and the issue of proximate cause; but it will be 
readily seen, upon consideration of the requested 
charge, that it does not take from the considera-
tion ,of the jury, as a question of fact, the issue of 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but it 
does take from the jury the question as to whether 
such negligence, if it existed, proximately contri-
buted to the plaintiff's injury and properly so.' " 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS 
& MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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